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The human resources manager of one of your firm's biggestclients calls you for some advice on a seemingly straightfor-ward issue. The issue deals with the notice requirements
under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). Specifically, does
the FMLA require employers to designate leave as FMLA leave or risk
having to provide more than the guaranteed 12 weeks of leave? The
manager quickly recites the facts.
The Facts
On March 17, 1999, the employer hired a new employee. In February
2000, the employee was diagnosed with cancer and was unable to
work. Under the employer's leave policy, all employees with at least
six months of service can take up to seven months of leave. Once
leave commences, employees must request a leave extension every
30 days.
On February 21, 2000, the employee requested medical leave and the
employer granted the leave request. The employee then requested
extensions monthly through August 15, 2000. All requests were granted.
Today is September 15, 2000. The employee's seven months of leave
will be exhausted on September 20, 2000, but the employee will be
unable to return to work at that time. In fact, the employee will be
unable to return to work until December.
The employer never personally notified the employee of her eligibility
for FMLA leave. Furthermore, the employer never designated the
seven months as FMLA leave. As soon as the manager said this, you
knew what was coming next. The employee has just requested leave
under the FMLA, in addition to the seven months already provided.
The manager believes they have given the employee all the leave she
is entitled to receive and asks you whether she must grant the
employee's FMLA leave request. You pull a dusty copy of the U.S.
Code off the shelf (or probably fire up your computer) and take a look
at the FMLA.
The FMLA
The FMLA entitles eligible employees to take a total of 12 workweeks
of leave during any 12-month period (1) to care for a newborn child,
(2) to care for a child placed with the employee for adoption or
foster care, (3) to care for a spouse, child or parent with a serious
health condition, or (4) because a serious health condition makes
the employee unable to perform the functions of her position. 29
U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1). In this case, the employee clearly fell within
the FMLA's protections as she was unable to work because of her
cancer. Therefore, the FMLA entitled her to take a total of 12 work-
weeks of leave.
Continued on page 8
Tory L. Lucas is a member of the
Nebraska State Bar Association. He
graduated with a B.A., Magna Cum
Laude, from Culver-Stockton
College and a J.D., Summa Cum
Laude, from Creighton University.
Tory is a captain in the United
States Air Force, is the deputy staff
judge advocate at Arnold Air Force
Base, Tennessee. Before entering
military service, he was a litigation
associate with Klass, Hanks, Stoos,
Stoik, Mugan, Villone & Phillips in
Sioux City, Iowa.
To Designate or Not to Designate Under
the Family and Medical Leave Act
by Tory L. Lucas
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1980293
4 The Nebraska Lawyer November 2000
Continued from page 7
If an employee takes leave under § 2612, the
employee is entitled to be restored to the
position the employee held before the leave
commenced or to an equivalent position. 29
U.S.C. § 2614(a)(1). In this case, however,
the employee took seven
months of leave as
opposed to 12 weeks.
You then come across a
provision that seems to
apply to this employer's
generous leave policy: "Nothing in this
Act…shall be construed to discourage
employers from adopting or retaining leave
policies more generous than any policies
that comply with the requirements under
this Act..." 29 U.S.C. § 2653. Again, your
client provided the employee seven months
of leave as opposed to the mere 12 weeks the
FMLA requires.
At this point in your analysis, your research
indicates that nothing in the FMLA requires
employers to designate employer-provided
leave of greater than 12 weeks as FMLA
leave or risk having to grant the employee
FMLA leave in addition to the employer-pro-
vided leave. At a minimum, though, the
FMLA clearly mandates that employers pro-
vide 12 weeks of leave to eligible employees.
Does it matter if the employer did not desig-
nate leave as FMLA leave, though, but pro-
vided more leave to the employee than
required by the FMLA?
As the statute does not clearly address your
issue, you decide to take a peek at the
implementing regulations. The FMLA
directed the Labor Secretary to prescribe
regulations to carry out the Act. 29 U.S.C. §
2654. According to the Department of Labor
(DOL) regulations, an employer must desig-
nate leave as FMLA leave. If an employer
does not designate leave as such, an
employee's FMLA leave entitlement is not
affected and the employee can still request
up to 12 weeks of FMLA leave in addition to
the employer-provided leave.
The DOL Regulations
The first regulation you read clearly places
the burden on the employer to designate
leave as FMLA leave:
An employer must observe any employ-
ment benefit program or plan that
ing the leave until after the leave com-
menced. If the employer has the requisite
knowledge to make a determination that the
paid leave is for an FMLA reason at the time
the employee either gives notice of the need
for leave or commences leave and fails to
designate the leave as FMLA leave (and so
notify the employee in
accordance with para-
graph (b)), the employer
may not designate leave
as FMLA leave retroac-
tively, and may
designate only prospectively as of the date
of notification to the employee of the
designation. In such circumstances, the
employee is subject to the full protections of
the Act, but none of the absence preceding the
notice to the employee of the designation may
be counted against the employee's 12-week
FMLA leave entitlement." 29 C.F.R. §
825.208(c) (emphasis added).
The Pit in Your Stomach
At this point in your analysis, you are
definitely starting to feel that this particular
employee is entitled to an additional 12
weeks of leave under the FMLA because
the employer did not comply with the
technical designation and notice provisions
of the implementing regulations. As the
employer provided 30 weeks of leave as
opposed to the FMLA's required 12, you can't
believe the employer must provide 12 more
weeks of leave or violate the law.
Notwithstanding the regulations clear desig-
nation requirement, you remember
the Chevron case from law school (or a
C.L.E. seminar).
In that case, the United States Supreme
Court declared that, in the absence of specif-
ic statutory language, agency regulations
"are given controlling weight unless they are
arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary
to the statute." Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 844 (1984). Specifically, the Court
provided a two-part analysis of agency regu-
lations. Courts must first determine
whether congressional intent is clear. Id. at
842-43. If congressional intent is clear, any
agency interpretation contrary to that intent
is not entitled to deference. Id. If the
statute is ambiguous, then courts must defer
to reasonable agency interpretation of the
statute. Id. at 843.
You immediately turn to caselaw to see if
provides greater family or medical
leave rights to employees than the
rights established by the FMLA…If an
employer provides greater unpaid family
leave rights than are afforded by the
FMLA, the employer is not required to
extend additional rights afforded by
FMLA, such as maintenance of health
benefits (other than through COBRA),
to the additional leave period not
covered by FMLA. If an employee
takes paid or unpaid leave and the
employer does not designate the leave
as FMLA leave, the leave taken does
not count against an employee's
FMLA entitlement.
29 C.F.R. § 825.700(a) (emphasis added).
You then turn to another provision, which
also makes it clear that an employer must
designate employer-provided leave as FMLA
leave and give notice of this designation to
the employee. "In all circumstances, it is
the employer's responsibility to designate
leave, paid or unpaid, as FMLA-qualifying,
and to give notice of the designation to the
employee as provided in this section." 29
C.F.R. § 825.208(a). At this point, it's
becoming clear that this employer failed to
follow the DOL regulations by not designat-
ing the leave as FMLA leave. Therefore, it
appears the employee would be entitled to
an additional 12 weeks of leave.
As to substituting employer-provided paid
leave for FMLA leave, the regulations are
just as clear. "If the employer requires paid
leave to be substituted for unpaid leave, or
that paid leave taken under an existing
leave plan be counted as FMLA leave, this
decision must be made by the employer
within two business days of the time the
employee gives notice of the need for leave,
or, where the employer does not initially
have sufficient information to make a deter-
mination, when the employer determines
that the leave qualifies as FMLA leave if this
happens later. The employer's designation
must be made before the leave starts, unless
the employer does not have sufficient infor-
mation as to the employee's reason for tak-
“The Pit in Your Stomach”
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courts have decided whether the DOL regu-
lations properly interpret the FMLA. There
just so happens to be a case on point.
The Case
In July 2000, the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals had this exact fact pattern before it.
The employer terminated the employee after
she had exhausted her seven months of
leave. When the employee requested
additional leave under the FMLA, the
employer denied her request because
she had requested and utilized all of her
available leave. The employee sued her
employer claiming a violation of the FMLA,
as well as the Americans with Disabilities
Act and the Arkansas Civil Rights Act.
Because her employer never formally desig-
nated her seven months of leave as FMLA
leave, the employee contended that the DOL
regulations properly mandated that the clock
never began to run on her FMLA leave, leav-
ing her 12 more weeks of available leave.
Addressing the FMLA claim, the court had to
determine whether the DOL regulations
quoted above, which require an employer to
designate leave as FMLA leave or risk hav-
ing to grant more leave than the required 12
weeks, "are a permissible interpretation of
the FMLA." Ragsdale v. Wolverine
Worldwide, Inc., 218 F.3d 933, 937
(8th Cir. 2000).
The Court began its analysis by discussing
the Chevron standard of review for deter-
mining whether agency regulations are
valid. Id. at 936. The court made it clear
that, "although the level of deference afford-
ed an agency interpretation may appear
high, the court remains the final authority
in matters of statutory interpretation and
must reject administrative constructions
which are contrary to clear congressional
intent." Id. (quotes omitted).
After the court quoted the FMLA substantive
provisions (as quoted above), the court stat-
ed the following: "Although the FMLA does
not itself require that the employer desig-
nate leave as FMLA leave, the DOL regula-
tions do require such designation. Seizing
on the lack of employer notice provisions in
the text of the statute, the DOL has issued a
series of regulations requiring that an
employer provide an employee with notice
that company leave is FMLA leave both in
situations where the employee is taking
paid leave and where the employee is taking
unpaid leave and providing for severe
consequences for the failure to give employees
such notice." Id. at 936-37 (emphasis added).
Specifically, the court quoted 29 C.F.R. §§
825.208(a), 825.208(c) and 825.700(a) (as
quoted above), highlighting DOL's mandate
that employers designate leave as FMLA
leave before employees' 12-week FMLA enti-
tlements begin to run.
After quoting the regulatory language, the
court immediately announced that "the
DOL's regulations improperly convert the
statute's minimum of federally-mandated
unpaid leave into an entitlement to an addi-
tional 12 weeks of leave unless the employer
specifically and prospectively notifies the
employee that she is using her FMLA leave.
The FMLA was intended only to set a mini-
mum standard of leave for employers to pro-
vide to employees. Under the FMLA, twelve
weeks of leave is both the minimum the
employer must provide and the maximum
that the statute requires." Id. at 937 (quotes
omitted/emphasis added).
The court stressed that the FMLA does not
interfere at all with employer leave policies
giving greater leave rights to its employees.
Id. The court also stated that the FMLA does
not require granting more leave than the
minimum 12 weeks. Id. at 938.
Buttressing this observation, the court quot-
ed 29 U.S.C. § 2652(a), which states that
nothing in the FMLA diminishes an employ-
er's obligation under an employment benefit
program to provide greater rights. Id. The
court also pointed to 29 U.S.C. § 2653(b),
which states that nothing in the FMLA
should discourage employers from retaining
more generous leave policies. Id.
Again, the FMLA "contemplate[s] only that
the employer will be required to provide a
'total' of twelve weeks of unpaid leave." Id.
The court underscored the fact that nothing
in the FMLA indicates that an employee is
entitled to more than 12 weeks of leave if the
employer's plan already provides at least 12
weeks of FMLA qualifying leave. Id.
The court then discussed a provision on the
relationship between FMLA leave and paid
leave, which could be interpreted as forcing
an employer to designate leave as FMLA
leave before the clock on that leave begins
to run: "An eligible employee may elect, or
an employer may require the employee, to
substitute any of the accrued paid vacation
leave, personal leave, or medical or sick
leave of the employee…for any part of the
twelve-week period of such leave…" Id.
(quoting 29 U.S.C. § 2612(d)(2)(B))
(emphasis added).
The court rejected any contention that this
provision mandates an employer to desig-
nate leave as FMLA leave or be forced to
grant more than the 12 weeks of leave
required by the FMLA. The court stated that
this provision's obvious purpose is to ensure
Continued on page 10
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notice could be necessary where the employ-
ee claims that the sole reason she exceeded
her FMLA leave was due to the employer's
failure to notify her that her leave was des-
ignated as FMLA leave and if she had been
so notified, she would have returned to work
at the end of the twelve-weeks. See
Longstreth v. Copple, 189
F.R.D. 401 (N.D. Iowa 1999).
Also, in some cases where
the leave was anticipated,
an employer's failure to pro-
vide notice that the leave
counts against the FMLA
entitlement could interfere
with the employee's ability
to plan and use future FMLA leave."
Ragsdale, 218 F.3d at 939-40.
The court inserted this cautionary statement
as dicta to limit the impact of striking down
the DOL designation regulation. The court
made clear that it simply held that the DOL
cannot expand the rights granted under the
FMLA. Specifically, the DOL was without
authority to increase the entitlement of 12
weeks by forcing employers who provide
greater than 12 weeks of leave to provide an
additional 12 weeks of leave just because
they failed to comply with a technical
requirement to provide notice.
Notwithstanding, the court left open the
possibility of finding a violation of the
FMLA when an employee's substantive
FMLA rights are impacted by an employer's
failure to designate the employee's leave as
FMLA leave.
The Other Circuits
The Eighth Circuit is not the only circuit
that has reviewed the DOL's designation
requirements. The Sixth and Eleventh
Circuit Courts of Appeals have also squarely
addressed the DOL's designation regula-
tions. As could be expected, the circuits are
split on whether these regulations are a
valid exercise of agency power.
Last summer, the Eleventh Circuit struck
down 29 C.F.R. § 825.208 on paid leave
because it converts the FMLA's minimum
leave requirements from 12 weeks to more
than 12 weeks unless the employer desig-
nates the leave as FMLA leave. McGregor v.
Autozone, Inc., 180 F.3d 1305, 1308 (11th
Cir. 1999). In fact, the Eighth Circuit agreed
with the Eleventh Circuit on this issue and
relied heavily on the reasoning found in
McGregor. Ragsdale, 218 F.3d at 937.
In the court's opinion, "Congress only
intended to mandate a minimum of 12
weeks of leave for employees, it did not
"are given controlling weight unless they are
arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary
to the statute." " Id. at 940
(emphasis added).
Applying these rules to the facts, the court
stated that the employer's 30 weeks of leave
was far more generous than the rights
granted to the employee under the FMLA
and "[t]o find that [the employer's] techni-
cal violation of the designation regulations
functions as a denial of the [employee's]
FMLA rights would be an egregious eleva-
tion of form over substance; a result clearly
not contemplated by the FMLA." Id.
As the DOL designation regulations directly
contradict the FMLA by increasing the
amount of leave employers must provide,
the court held "29 C.F.R. § 825.700(a)
invalid insofar as it purports to require an
employer to provide more than twelve-weeks
of leave time." Id.
The "But"
Notwithstanding the court's clear holding
that § 825.700(a) is invalid because it
requires employers to provide more than
the statutorily required 12 weeks of leave if
the employer fails to give proper notice,
the court included one paragraph in its
opinion that may cause some confusion.
Id. at 939-40.
The court stressed that not all "DOL regula-
tions requiring employers to designate leave
as FMLA leave would be invalid." Id. at 939.
According to the court's dicta, an employer's
failure to give notice could impact an
employee's substantive FMLA rights in cer-
tain situations. Id.
The court then gave two examples of when
an employer's failure to give notice could
result in an FMLA violation. "For example,
Continued from page 9
that the FMLA does not disadvantage either
the employer or employee. Id. Specifically,
this provision protects the employee by
enabling the employee to take paid employer-
provided leave. Id. It also protects
the employer by allowing the employer to
require the employee to
take employer-provided
leave, which saves itself
from extending more leave
than required. Id.
Honing in on the DOL's
apparent justification for
the designation provi-
sions, the court stated that the "DOL has
failed to appreciate and differentiate those
circumstances when notice should be
required from employers in
order to protect employee's substantive FMLA
rights from those situations where notice is
not necessary to protect FMLA rights…the
Secretary of Labor has apparently seized
upon the 'employer may require' provision in
§ 2612(d)(2)(B) to justify the imposition of
a disproportionate penalty in all cases where
employers fail to designate leave as FMLA
leave." Id.
The court also showed that the FMLA's
statutory scheme reveals Congress knew
exactly how to provide for notice provisions
when it intended, along with consequences
for violating those provisions. Id. (citing
§2612(e)(1) (employee's notice obligations);
§2614(b)(1)(B) (employer's obligation to give
notice to highly compensated employees
refusing to restore them to their positions);
and § 2619 (employer's obligation to post
FMLA notices on the premises)).
Finally, the court determined that the FMLA's
legislative history also supports the conclu-
sion that the FMLA "was intended only to be
a statute that provided a minimum labor
standard; an assurance that employers would
provide employees with twelve-weeks of
leave every year…Any other view…would
likely upset the careful compromise reached
by Congress when it passed the FMLA." Id.
at 939 (cites omitted).
Therefore, based on the FMLA's plain
meaning, statutory scheme and legislative
history, the court declared that the "DOL
regulations must be struck down" because
they "create rights which the statute clearly
does not confer." Id.
“are given controlling weight unless they arearbitrary, capricious, or manifestly
contrary to the statute”
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In McGregor, a supervisor took fifteen
weeks off work when she gave birth.
Upon returning to work, she found out
she had been demoted. Claiming her
FMLA rights had been violated by her
employer's failure to restore her to her
previous position, the employee sued.
Because her employer never notified her
that her paid disability leave and FMLA
leave would run concurrently, the employ-
ee contended that she was entitled to
thirteen weeks of employer-provided paid
disability leave and then 12 weeks of
unpaid FMLA leave.
The court analyzed the FMLA's plain
meaning, construction, purpose and legisla-
tive history and determined that the FMLA
simply provides for a baseline of 12 weeks of
leave and in no way suggests that this 12
week entitlement may be extended.
McGregor, 180 F.3d at 1308.
Noting that the FMLA's purpose is to "bal-
ance the demands of the workplace with the
needs of families…in a manner that accom-
modates the legitimate interests of employ-
ers," the court stated that the DOL regula-
tions are inconsistent with the stated pur-
pose by adding requirements and granting
entitlements beyond those found in the
statute. Id.
Revealing a disgust for the position in which
the DOL regulations place a generous
employer, the court stated the following:
"Where an employer such as defendant
exceeds the baseline 12 weeks by providing
not only more leave than the FMLA but also
paid leave, the employer should not find
itself sued for violating FMLA." Id.
The court then struck down the DOL desig-
nation provisions as "invalid and unenforce-
able" because they are contrary to the FMLA,
holding that the defendant employer properly
exercised its FMLA rights by requiring its
employee to substitute her paid leave for her
12 weeks of FMLA leave. Id. As the employ-
ee was absent for more than the FMLA pro-
tected time, the FMLA did not mandate
restoration to her prior position. Id.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, on the
other hand, upheld the DOL designation pro-
visions in Plant v. Morton International, Inc.,
212 F.3d 929 (6th Cir. 2000). Accord Cline v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 294, 300 (4th
Cir. 1998) (citing § 825.700(a) for the propo-
sition that, "although an employer
has the option of requiring an employee to
designate vacation or other leave as FMLA
leave, that option is waived if the employer
fails to give proper notice of its intentions");
Price v. City of Fort Wayne, 117 F.3d 1022,
1026 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing § 825.208(a)
with approval); Ritchie v. Grand Casinos of
Mississippi, Inc., 49 F.Supp.2d 878, 881 (S.D.
Miss. 1999) (upholding § 825.208 because
the DOL permissibly "filled in the gaps" of
the FMLA).
In Plant, an employee's injuries required
him to take a paid leave of absence from
work. He did not request FMLA leave and
his employer did not designate that his
leave would count against his FMLA enti-
tlement. While the employee was still on
leave due to his medical problems, he was
terminated. The employee claimed his
termination violated the FMLA, while the
employer contended his termination was
for poor performance. Notwithstanding,
his employer argued that he would not
have been able to return to work within
12 weeks anyway, so he would have
exhausted all of his FMLA leave at that
time. Admitting that he would have been
unable to return to work within 12 weeks,
the employee countered by arguing that
his FMLA leave had never started because
his employer never notified him that it was
designating his leave as FMLA leave.
Based on these facts, the court addressed
whether the DOL's designation provisions
are valid, i.e., whether an employee's FMLA
leave entitlement does not begin to run
until the employer designates the leave as
FMLA leave.
Although the court readily accepted the fact
that the "FMLA itself is silent as to the
notice an employer must give to an
Continued on page 12
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Designating leave as FMLA leave would also
avoid depriving an employee of her FMLA
entitlements. Of course, any leave policy
could also say that the failure to designate
leave as FMLA leave does not grant an
employee greater rights than those granted
under the FMLA. This would, in essence,
simply reiterate the Ragsdale holding so that
an employer would not be required to grant
more leave than required under the FMLA if
it failed for some reason to designate leave
as FMLA leave.
Notwithstanding, the FMLA certainly does
not condemn employers who provide greater
leave benefits to its employees than required
under the FMLA. It even encourages this
policy. It also does not punish them for
failing to designate employer-provided leave
as FMLA leave, as long as the employee's
substantive FMLA rights have been
protected. However, a clear leave policy
consistently applied would erase the need
to have courts determine whether a technical
violation of the DOL regulations actually vio-
lates the FMLA. Your job is to help your
client save those fights for other employers
and employees.
This article expresses the views of Tory L. Lucas and does
not reflect or represent the views of the Department of
Defense or the United States Air Force.
may be forced to take an FMLA case in the
near future to determine whether the DOL
designation regulations are a valid exercise
of agency power when they require an
employer to provide more than 12 weeks of
leave. Of course, another possibility is that
the DOL could change its regulations under
another administration. At this point,
though, employers must comply with the law
in their circuit.
Although employers in the Eighth Circuit
(Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota,
Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri and Arkansas)
and Eleventh Circuit (Alabama, Florida
and Georgia) who provide more leave
than required under the FMLA may not
be legally required to designate that leave
as FMLA leave or risk having to grant an
additional 12 weeks, they may want to do
so anyway.
An employer should provide all employees
with a clear leave policy, which addresses
FMLA leave and how it relates to employer-
provided leave (whether paid or unpaid).
Employees should read and understand the
policy. Leave-granting supervisors and
human resource managers must understand
and correctly implement the policy.
Finally, determining an employee's eligibility
for FMLA leave and designating leave as
FMLA leave certainly would not hurt the
employer-employee relationship. Clear com-
munication regarding the employer's leave
policy would help erase misunderstandings
and alleviate misinformation, which often-
times cause employment disputes.
Continued from page 11
employee before designating his paid leave
as FMLA leave," the court stated that the
DOL designation provision (§ 825.208(c))
"evinces a reasonable understanding of the
FMLA, reflecting Congress's concerns with
providing ample notice to employees of their
rights under the statute." Id. at 935. In sup-
port of this contention, the court cited 29
U.S.C. § 2619(a), which simply mandates
that employers post FMLA notices in con-
spicuous work places. Nothing in Plant sug-
gests the employer failed to post FMLA
notices in violation of § 2619.
The court also highlighted that, because the
FMLA was intended to set out minimum
labor standards, the DOL designation provi-
sion is consistent with legislative intent
even though "it creates the possibility that
employees could end up receiving more than
12 weeks of leave in one twelve-month peri-
od, due to an employer's failure to notify
them that the clock has started to run on
their allotted period of leave." Id. at 935-36.
Rejecting the Eleventh Circuit's analysis and
holding in McGregor, the court concluded
that the DOL's designation regulations "are
valid and forbid employers from retroactively
designating FMLA leave if they have not
given proper notice to their employees that
their statutory entitlement period has begun
to run." Id. at 936.
The Future
As a clear split in authority has developed on
this issue, the United State Supreme Court
